Singapore's Foreign Policy by Amitav Acharya

Author:Amitav Acharya [Acharya, Amitav]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9789814474733
Published: 2008-07-15T00:00:00+00:00

Functionalism and Economic Interdependence

The balance of power metaphor so often applied to describe Singapore’s foreign policy towards China and India belies a much more eclectic, complex and diverse strategy adopted by its policy-makers. Diplomatic accommodation, economic interdependence, and regional cooperation and socialization play a major role in the way Singapore has responded to the rise of China and India.

The first visit by the new Singapore Prime Minister to China happened in October 2005. It was especially significant because of the row between the two countries over Lee Hsien Loong’s unofficial visit to Taiwan in July 2004. The Chinese reaction then was swift and vigorous: “Whatever pretext the Singaporean leader uses for his visit to Taiwan”, the Chinese Foreign Affairs spokesperson had insisted, “the visit will damage China’s core interest and the political foundation for China-Japan relations”.22 Beijing’s retaliation included a freezing of official economic exchanges. Singapore defended Lee’s visit as an unofficial event before he assumed the Prime Minister’s job, aimed at learning more about the domestic situation in Taiwan that would have enormous implications for Singapore and the region. But it was also quick to reaffirm the One China policy, not only for itself, but also for the whole of Asia. “If Taiwan goes independent”, said Lee Hsien Loong on August 12, 2004, “Singapore will not recognize it. In fact no Asian country will recognize it”. This act of accommodation drew a favorable response from Beijing; it “accords well with the interest of Singapore”, said the Chinese Foreign Ministry.23

Lee Hsien Loong’s October 2005 visit resulted, in his own words, in “a good series of meetings” with Chinese leaders held in a “strategic and regional context”, which showed a “convergence of views”.24 Chinese leader Hu Jintao accepted Lee’s invitation to visit Singapore. But the idea of a bilateral Singapore-China Free Trade Agreement wanted by Singapore is still held back by Beijing, which has concerns about its impact on China’s overall regional trade liberalization strategy. This not withstanding, Foreign Minister George Yeo would later describe the outlook for Singapore-China relations as “very bright”.25 Singapore’s dealings with China were aimed not only at developing a good understanding between their two countries, it was also Singapore’s policy to “help China establish enduring good relations” with all the ASEAN members.26

Singapore’s diplomatic relations with India has required no fence-mending. The end of the Cambodia conflict had removed the key barrier to the political relationship between India and ASEAN that had emerged over India’s recognition of the Vietnamese-installed Heng Samarin regime in Cambodia, which ASEAN had fought to deny international legitimacy. But India and Singapore have to go much further to bring their economic relationship closer to the level now obtaining between Singapore and China. Bilateral Singapore-China trade amounted to S$60 billion in 2005.27 By comparison, Singapore-India trade was $11.5 billion in 2004.28 This has much to do with the fact that India’s economic reforms were at least two decades behind that of China. Nevertheless, Singapore’s economic links with India are accelerating; although the estimate by

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